The intelligence community has been the object of increased scrutiny since last eight years down the line. Criticism has been focused largely on the inability of the intelligence to gather sufficient information to predict the attacks. Although substantial information was available unless agencies within the intelligence community could share existing information across departmental and agency boundaries and accurate assessment of threats to national security would not be possible.
These obstacles include originator control.
Agencies Offices that create insight force this proviso while scattering crude and completed knowledge to restrict facilitate dispersal without their endorsement. Accordingly, an office may get essential data that could be useful to a third organization that isn’t a beneficiary, however, might not be able to offer it in light of the admonition. In spite of the fact that this issue can be settled through settled upon techniques, the procedure can be long and awkward and may not meet the close continuous lines frequently required to track and catch fear based oppressor suspects. Hill, Eleanor, and Joint Inquiry Staff. “Counterterrorism Information Sharing with Other Federal Agencies and with State and Local Governments and the Private Sector.” (2012).
Secondly, non-intelligence community agencies are often unable to access vital counterterrorism-related information. Some federal agencies don’t have faculty cleared for SCI information, prompted that they could have profited from accepting more particular information on potential fear mongers.
Many state and neighborhood organizations don’t have workforce cleared for even the most reduced level of access to national security data, not to mention SCI get to. Thus, while suitably cleared FAA, TSA, INS, and Department of State authorities may get critical insight data, they might be not able to scatter information inside their association or to state and nearby authorities in light of the fact that the potential beneficiaries are not cleared to get it.
The staff review, to date, has discovered no single organization or database or computer network that incorporates all counter-terrorism oppression data across the nation. Data about the criminals and al-Qaida can be found in divergent databases spread among a scope of knowledge and nonmilitary personnel offices. Gosz, Joseph R. “A Critical Analysis and Study of Fusion Center Integration and Utilization In Contemporary Homeland Security and Law Enforcement Operations.” Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin-Platteville, 2015.
In particular, as exemplified by the Phoenix correspondence that was talked about in detail at an earlier hearing, FBI data identified with conceivable al-Qaida terrorists were scattered in different local workplaces and not imparted to the FBI base camp or different organizations. Besides, legal authorization, movement, visa, and knowledge data identified with the 19 hijackers were not composed in any way to take into consideration any one organization to identify fear mongering related patterns and examples in their exercises
Most of the data identified with the psychological terrorists and hijackers to dangers postured via airship went to the non-Intelligence Community offices from the CIA, NSA, and FBI. As indicated by authorities from the Departments of Transportation, State, Energy, Defense, and Treasury, unless data in the ownership of the CIA, NSA, and FBI is shared on a convenient premise, they can exclude risky people on different watch records to either deny them passage into the United States or capture presumed fear mongers in the United States.
The State Department, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the U.S. Traditions Service all keep up watch lists of named people. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), INS, and different organizations likewise play out a constrained measure of data accumulation intended to put people on watch lists.
Recommendation on how to address these obstacles
One strategy for managing information sharing issues is for organizations to detail workers to CIA, NSA, FBI, and different offices trying to enhance access to applicable data on a convenient premise. Hypothetically, in any event, the organizations trust this is a standout amongst the best approaches to get to a more noteworthy measure of data from the Intelligence Community. Clark, Robert M., and Simon Hakim. “Protecting Critical Infrastructure at the State, Provincial, and Local Level: Issues in Cyber-Physical Security.” In Cyber-Physical Security, pp. 1-17. Springer International Publishing, 2017.
To improve information sharing, the DOJ, through the FBI, has established up 56 Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) to include other government, state, and neighborhood offices in an examination of psychological oppressor occasions. The JTTF program is planned to forestall demonstrations of fear-based oppression before they happen by aiding ID, examinations, and indictment. Each JTTF is in charge of managing local and worldwide fear mongering matters inside the purview of the nearby FBI field office. Peled, Alon. “Coerce, Consent, and Coax A Review of US Congressional Efforts to Improve Federal Counterterrorism Information Sharing.” Terrorism and Political Violence 28, no. 4 (2016): 674-691.
Offices taking an interest in the JTTF are required to enter a formal reminder of understanding that distinguishes the targets of the JTTF as both receptive and proactive. In its receptive mission, the JTTF reacts to and explores psychological oppressor occurrences. In its proactive mission, the JTTF examines local and outside psychological militant gatherings and people focusing on or working inside its purview with the objective of forestalling fear monger occasions.
Hill, Eleanor, and Joint Inquiry Staff. “Counterterrorism Information Sharing with Other Federal Agencies and with State and Local Governments and the Private Sector.” (2012).
Peled, Alon. “Coerce, Consent, and Coax A Review of US Congressional Efforts to Improve Federal Counterterrorism Information Sharing.” Terrorism and Political Violence 28, no. 4 (2016): 674-691.
Clark, Robert M., and Simon Hakim. “Protecting Critical Infrastructure at the State, Provincial, and Local Level: Issues in Cyber-Physical Security.” In Cyber-Physical Security, pp. 1-17. Springer International Publishing, 2017.
Gosz, Joseph R. “A Critical Analysis and Study of Fusion Center Integration and Utilization In Contemporary Homeland Security and Law Enforcement Operations.” Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin-Platteville, 2015.